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Despite decades of energetic international control efforts, nuclear weapons tech-
nology continues to spread worldwide.  To understand how these complex weapons 
programs can be developed, we assume the role of a nation seeking to build a first fission 
weapon, and the ability to continue to build more.  We introduce a large-scale project 
management model that includes alternate development paths to achieve certain key 
technical milestones.  We show how such a project can be optimally accelerated by expe-
diting critical tasks.  Next, we present a new analysis tool to detect vulnerabilities in such 
a development program:  we seek optimal actions to impede, set back and/or otherwise 
frustrate completion of a first weapon, even if the proliferator knows what we are doing 
to delay things.  This two-sided project evaluation tool is implemented with a combina-
tion of off-the-shelf project management software, optimization software and custom 
code.  An illustrative case study of a first fission weapon program shows how this new 
analysis tool can be used.  Our methods also apply to chemical, biological and/or radio-





























The reader is cautioned that the computer programs developed in this research 
may not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs without 
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We introduce a model for planning, even expediting, development of a nation’s 
first operational nuclear weapon.  Our goal is to understand how such a complex project 
can be conducted by a belligerent state so that we might find vulnerabilities to exploit:  
we seek actions to delay, impede, interdict and/or otherwise frustrate completion of such 
a weapon of mass destruction. 
Preventing the proliferation of such devices is an international priority.  The 1968 
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been ratified by 188 na-
tions, more than any other international arms control agreement.  Global proliferation 
concerns have been renewed by recent world events such as North Korea’s withdrawal 
from NPT and revelations of Libya’s clandestine work on nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear weapon development attracts intense global scrutiny.  The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), chartered by the United Nations, is responsible for veri-
fying that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes by enforcing safeguards 
imposed by the treaty.  Any nation that has ratified NPT and is now attempting to de-
velop its first nuclear weapon would therefore almost certainly run a covert program.  
Outside discovery of such a program would depend on intelligence gathering or a public 
announcement by the proliferators intended to intimidate other nations into favorable po-
litical or economic concessions.  When IAEA inspections are denied or a nation like 
North Korea withdraws from the treaty, the international community may take other steps 
to counter the proliferation threat. 
We introduce a project management tool to identify the tasks in a weapons devel-
opment program that are most critical to its timely completion.  We highlight the effect of 
delaying an individual task, or set of tasks, on completion of a weapon.  These delays 
might be inflicted by deliberate interdiction of the weapon project; in fact, we might 
choose to set back certain milestones already achieved, as Israel did in 1981 when they 
successfully bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor facility.  In addition to military action, delay-
 xv
ing actions might also include sabotage of facilities or supplies, embargo or blockade of 
material shipments, or motivating key personnel to leave the program. 
Mathematics-based methods of scheduling and managing complex projects have 
been widely employed in government and industry since the late 1950’s.  The original 
Program Evaluation Review Technique/Critical Path Method (PERT/CPM) models have 
been extended in a variety of ways over the years to incorporate situations that arise in 
different types of projects.  Here, we must combine several of these individual embel-
lishments. 
The weapon developer, referred to henceforth as the “proliferator,” wants to 
minimize the duration of the project to develop a nuclear weapon by reducing the dura-
tion of as many tasks as he can afford.  We present a novel and flexible model that 
captures many of the issues involved in expediting such a sophisticated research and de-
velopment project.  We include the ability to choose among alternatives that are 
sometimes available for achieving certain milestones, scheduling restrictions based on the 
availability of scarce resources, and “crashing” the project (i.e., shortening project dura-
tion by applying additional resources to selected tasks), among others.  Using this tool as 
a forecast of proliferation plans, we next seek an optimal set of tasks in the project to in-
terdict in order to inflict the most delay in its completion. 
The project interdictor wants to impede progress to make the project take as long 
as possible, subject to constraints on what he can afford to do.  He may exert interdiction 
effort against a particular task in a variety of ways, constrained by a monetary budget or 
the political, environmental or economic implications of his actions. 
We develop a two-sided optimization:  the proliferator and the interdictor can 
each see what the opponent is doing, and can each behave optimally with resources at 
hand to, respectively, minimize and maximize the time to completion of a first fission 
weapon.  This optimization provides a powerful analytical tool.  It can be used to identify 
the most vulnerable tasks in the project, to suggest alternate delay plans with equivalent 
delaying effects to a policy maker and to explore the sensitivity of the project duration to 
the inputs. 
 xvi
Our prototypic decision support system is implemented using off-the-shelf soft-
ware.  All user interaction and data management are done through software already 
familiar to millions of personal computer users.  Powerful optimization software, unfa-
miliar to many potential users of this product, is hidden behind a straightforward user 
interface incorporated within standard project management software. 
Computational experience with our case study shows that good solutions can be 
found quickly.  “What-if” questions regarding particular delay plans can be answered in a 
fraction of a second using a desktop personal computer.  An analyst can take advantage 
of this speed to explore a wide range of assumptions and find the tasks that are most criti-
cal to the expeditious completion of the proliferator’s project. 
This low-cost tool can be used today.  It provides quantitative information that 
can be used to guide policy makers working to stop the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, or to disrupt more conventional strate-
gic industrial and commercial activities. 
In our case study, an uninterdicted first weapon is completed in 260 weeks (5 
years).  Interdiction of this proliferation program, if kept secret from the proliferator, de-
lays completion to 340 weeks (6 12 years).  Finally, if we assume that the proliferator can 
see what the interdictor is doing, and adjust his plan accordingly, we still delay comple-
tion to 324.4 weeks ( 6 14  years).  This demonstrates the value to the interdictor of 
keeping his actions secret, but, more importantly, exposes the inherent vulnerability of 
such a large project to a few well-placed interdiction actions.  It also demonstrates to the 
proliferator that a covert project can be completed nearly 15 months faster than one 
which is known by the enemy and therefore subject to interdiction. 
We are suggesting how to organize and manage intelligence data in a cohesive 
fashion that offers visualization, data base functionality and interoperability with Micro-
soft Office.  The optimization is new, but hidden cleanly from view.  An analyst, or even 
a policy maker, can pose questions, get answers and gain deep insights without any 
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I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
A. BELLIGERENT STATES SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
We introduce a model for planning, even expediting, development of a nuclear 
weapon.  Our goal is to understand how such a complex project can be conducted by a 
belligerent state so that we might find vulnerabilities to exploit:  we seek actions to delay, 
impede, interdict and/or otherwise frustrate completion of such a weapon of mass de-
struction. 
Nearly sixty years after the first nuclear weapon was detonated, preventing the 
proliferation of such devices is an international priority.  One hundred eighty-eight na-
tions have ratified the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
more than any other international arms control agreement [United Nations, 2004].  North 
Korea’s recent withdrawal from NPT and Libya’s revelations of work on nuclear weap-
ons have renewed global proliferation concerns. 
Production of nuclear weapons attracts intense global scrutiny; because of NPT 
safeguards currently in place, any nation attempting to develop its first nuclear weapon 
would almost certainly run a covert program.  Outside discovery of such a program 
would depend on intelligence gathering or a public announcement by the proliferators 
intended to intimidate other nations into favorable political or economic concessions.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), chartered by the United Nations, is 
responsible for verifying that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes 
[United Nations, 1968, Article III].  When IAEA inspections are denied or a nation like 
North Korea withdraws from the treaty, the international community may take other 
steps:  the successful attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility by the Israeli Air Force in 
1981 [e.g., Federation of American Scientists, 2000] is an example.  Alarmed by intelli-
gence that Iraq could assemble a functional nuclear weapon within two years, the Israelis 
chose an immediate military option rather than a diplomatic solution. 
B. A PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION 
We introduce a project management tool to identify the tasks in a weapons devel-
opment program that are most critical to its timely completion.  We highlight the effect of 
1
delaying an individual task, or set of tasks, on completion of a weapon.  These delays 
might be inflicted by deliberate interdiction of the weapon project:  in fact, we might 
choose to set back certain milestones already achieved.  Delaying actions might include 
sabotage of facilities or supplies, embargo or blockade of material shipments, or even 
military acts.  Although our example is nuclear weapon development, our methods apply 
just as well to chemical, biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, as well as to 
more conventional strategic industrial and commercial activities. 
Since the late 1950’s, mathematics-based methods of scheduling and managing 
complex projects have been widely employed in government and industry.  The original 
Program Evaluation Review Technique/Critical Path Method (PERT/CPM) models [Mal-
colm, et al, 1959] have been extended over the years to incorporate a variety of situations 
that arise in different types of projects, such as alternate choices that are sometimes avail-
able for achieving certain milestones, scheduling restrictions based on the availability of 
scarce resources, and “crashing” the project (i.e., shortening project duration by applying 
additional effort to selected tasks), among other additions.  Due to the complexity of nu-
clear weapons programs, we need all these embellishments. 
Project management models are universally represented as networks [e.g., Moder, 
Phillips and Davis, 1983, Chapter 1].  In such a representation, the overall duration of the 
project is the additive length of the longest path through the network, also known as the 
critical path.  The weapon developer, referred to henceforth as the “proliferator,” wants 
to minimize the duration of the project to develop a nuclear weapon by reducing the dura-
tion of as many “critical” tasks as he can afford.  While building the project, he may be 
able to choose among several alternate means available to reach some milestone. 
The project interdictor wants to impede progress to make the project take as long 
as possible, subject to constraints on what the interdictor can afford to do.  He may exert 
interdiction effort against a particular task in a variety of ways, constrained by a mone-
tary budget or the political, environmental or economic implications of his actions. 
We develop a two-sided optimization:  the proliferator and the interdictor can 
each see what their opponent is doing, and can each behave optimally with resources at 
2
hand to, respectively, minimize and maximize the completion of a first fission weapon, 
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II. MODELING PROLIFERATION AND ITS INTERDICTION 
A. PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
Embarking on a program to develop a nation’s first nuclear weapon requires a 
significant investment of materials, manpower and technology.  Even for a modern indus-
trialized nation, this investment will likely represent a significant fraction of that nation’s 
available resources.  Such a program is a massive undertaking and we assume that it 
would be subject to intense high-level management scrutiny and careful, centralized co-
ordination. 
Moder, Phillips and Davis [1983, p. 3] define a project as “a set of tasks or activi-
ties related to the achievement of some planned objective, normally where the objective 
is unique or non-repetitive.”  Our proliferator’s program to develop his first nuclear 
weapon fits this definition well.  We can reasonably expect him to employ standard pro-
ject management tools to plan and organize the project in order to efficiently schedule its 
tasks.  We assume that once the proliferator commits substantial national resources to-
wards the development of a nuclear weapon, he wants to complete his project and obtain 
the first operational weapon as quickly as possible. 
Our proliferator’s problem can be represented most simply as a classic project 
network enhanced to allow crashing [e.g., Moder, Phillips and Davis, 1983, Chapter 8].  
However, we recognize that this model is inadequate to represent many situations that 
can occur in practical real-world projects.  To this classic project network, we add the 
following embellishments: 
• Completion of any task in a “normal” amount of time consumes a fixed 
amount of one or more non-renewable resources. 
• The duration of an individual task may be shortened (“crashed”) by allocation 
of additional quantities of the required resources.  We assume a linear rela-
tionship between the amounts of additional resources provided and the 
duration of the task—more resources accelerates progress.  Each task requires 
some minimum amount of time, no matter how many additional resources are 
allocated to it. 
• Crashing is limited by the availability of each resource and by an overall 
monetary budget. 
5
• Certain milestone tasks may be achieved via alternate courses of action.  
When one alternate path is chosen, the tasks in the other alternative(s) need 
not be completed.  A decision node is a task in the project network where al-
ternate courses of action diverge. 
• The project being delayed may already be partially completed.  If a task that 
was previously in progress or completed is interdicted, it and all of its succes-
sors must be restarted and completed again in order to finish the project. 
• Standard finish-to-start precedence relationships between pairs of tasks are 
generalized to include start-to-start, finish-to-finish or start-to-finish.  There is 
a finite time lag (or lead) associated with each precedence constraint. 
• The project may include a hierarchical grouping of the tasks.  A summary task 
represents the tasks grouped below it in a hierarchy (its “children”) but does 
not consume resources or otherwise contribute to the completion of the pro-
ject.  Summary tasks can be given their own precedence relationship(s) with 
other tasks in the project.  Accommodating them requires introducing dummy 
precedence arcs into the network to ensure a summary task starts no later than 
any of its children and to preclude finishing until all of its children finish.  The 
summary task must be completed if any of its children are completed and the 
children must be completed if the summary task is forced to start by other 
precedence constraints. 
• Interdicting a task delays its completion by a constant amount. 
• Possible delay plans are limited by a maximum total number of interdictions 
and by an interdiction “budget.”  This budget may represent total financial 
cost or level of geopolitical impact for each interdiction action. 
The proliferator’s objective is to minimize the length of the critical path in this 
network.  We first determine what the proliferator would do without any threat of inter-
diction. 
B. EXPEDITING A PROJECT WITH NO INTERDICTION 
We are now going to formalize these concepts with a generalization of a well-
known project management tool. 
1. Sets and Index Use 
We use an activity on node (AON) formulation of the project network, employing 
the following sets of tasks, task relationships and resources.  In the AON formulation, the 
nodes in the network represent the individual tasks in the project and the arcs represent 
the pairwise partial orders between respective predecessor and successor tasks. 
i, j ∈ N  tasks (nodes) 
σ, τ ∈ N  start and finish milestone tasks, respectively 
DN ⊂ N  decision nodes 
6
ST ⊂ N  hierarchical summary tasks 
AN ⊆ N  all tasks except the decision nodes and summary tasks; 
AN = N − DN − ST  
i, j( )∈ A precedence relationships:  task i precedes task j (arcs) 
FS ⊆ A  implies task i must finish before task j can start i, j( )∈ FS
FF ⊆ A  implies task i must finish before task j can finish i, j( )∈ FF
SF ⊆ A   implies task i must start before task j can finish i, j( )∈ SF
SS ⊆ A   implies task i must start before task j can start i, j( )∈ SS
 FS, FF, SF and SS are mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets of A 
CHILD ⊂ A   if task j is subordinate to summary task i i, j( )∈ CHILD
r ∈ R  non-renewable resources 
2. Data [units] 
t elapsed time since the beginning of the project [days] 
pi fraction of work on task i ∈ N  that is complete at time t [ 0 ≤ pi ≤1] 
lagij time lag for a precedence constraint i, j( )∈ A [days] 
d i , di  duration of task i ∈ N  with no crashing effort and maximal crashing ef-
fort, respectively [days] 
bi , b i  minimum and maximum number, respectively, of successor tasks allowed 
to be chosen at decision node i ∈ DN  [non-negative integer] 
rrir  minimum resource requirement for resource r ∈ R  to complete task i ∈ N  
with no crashing effort [resource r-units] 
rerir  resource expediting rate of resource r ∈ R  for task i ∈ N  [resource r-
units/day] 
cr unit cost of resource r ∈ R  [$/resource r-unit] 
ar total availability of resource r ∈ R  [resource r-units] 
budget crashing cost budget [$] 
delayi amount task i ∈ N − DN − ST −σ − τ  is delayed when interdicted [days] 
m a “large” number used to relax the precedence constraints for tasks that are 
not actually completed; m = max
i∈N d i + delayi( )+ maxi, j( )∈A lagij( ) [days] 
3. Variables [units] 
Si earliest start time of task i ∈ N  [days] 
Di the decision plan; Di =1 if task i ∈ N  is completed, 0 otherwise [binary] δi  the crashing plan; δi  is the amount task i ∈ N − DN −σ − τ  is accelerated 
by crashing [days] 
7
4. Expediting a Project 
min
S,D,δ  Sτ − Sσ    (a0) 
s.t. S j + m 1− Di( )≥ Si + d i −δi( )+ lagij  ∀ i, j( )∈ FS  (a1) 
 S j + d j −δ j( )+ m 1− Di( )≥  ∀ i, j( )∈ FF  (a2) 
  Si + d i −δi( )+ lagij  
 S j + d j −δ j( )+ m 1− Di( )≥ Si + lagij  ∀ i, j( )∈ SF  (a3) 
  S j + m 1− Di( )≥ Si + lagij ∀ i, j( )∈ SS  (a4) 
 ( )irr i ir i
r i N




 + ≤ ∑ ∑
  (a5) 
 rrirDi + rerirδi( )
i∈N−σ −τ
∑ ≤ ar  ∀r ∈ R  (a6) 
 biDi ≤ Dj
j | i, j( )∈A− CHILD∩FF( )
∑ ≤ b iDi  ∀i ∈ DN  (a7) 
  Dj ≥ Di ∀ i, j( )∈ A − CHILD | i ∈ N − DN( ) (a8) 
  Dj ≥ Di ∀ i, j( )∈ CHILD | (a9) 
   
∃ n,i( )∈ A | n,i( )∉ CHILD & i,n( )∉ CHILD( )( )






   
 0 ≤ δi ≤ d i − di  ∀i ∈ N − DN −σ − τ  (a10) 
  Di ∈ 0,1{ } ∀i ∈ N  (a11) 
 Sσ = 0, Dσ =1   (a12) 
  Di =1 ∀i ∈ N | pi > 0  (a13) 
 Si ≥ t  ∀i ∈ N − ST | pi = 0 (a14) 
 Si = t − pi d i −δi( ) ∀i ∈ N | 0 < pi <1 (a15) 
 Si ≤ t − d i −δi( ) ∀i ∈ N | pi =1 (a16) 
The proliferator seeks to minimize the overall length of the project, expressed in 
(a0) as the difference between the finish time and the start time.  All of the choices made 
among alternatives at the decision nodes are captured in the resulting decision plan.  The 
crashing plan specifies the level of additional effort applied to each task to speed it up.  
The decision plan and the crashing plan together encompass all of the decisions that the 
proliferator must make to expedite the project.  They are collectively referred to as the 
expediting plan. 
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Constraints (a1) to (a4) enforce pairwise task partial orders.  Each of these con-
straints features the length of a task, d i −δi( ), its normal duration minus the amount of 
crashing effort.  The term m 1− Di( ) [Crowston and Thompson, 1967] relaxes its con-
straint if task i is not one of the tasks actually completed in the final decision plan (i.e., a 
decision takes an alternate course of action). 
Constraints (a5) and (a6) respectively enforce the monetary budget and resource 
availabilities.  Constraints (a7) limit the number of alternatives allowed at each decision 
point.  Constraints (a8) ensure that a task is forced to be completed if any of its predeces-
sors are, except for tasks that are children of a summary task.  Constraints (a9) force 
children of a summary task to be completed only if the summary task has predecessors 
and the child is not directly affected by a decision.  (a10) show that each task has a 
maximum crash effort (that gives it a shortest duration).  Task completion decisions are 
required to be binary in (a11).  Constraint (a12) completes the starting task no matter 
what decisions are made later on and starts the project at time zero. 
Constraints (a13) force the decision plan to include every task that has already 
commenced, reflecting any decisions already made.  Constraints (a14) require tasks with 
no recorded progress to start no sooner than the current time.  (a15) set the start time of 
tasks that have started but not finished while (a16) ensure completed tasks are assigned 
start times early enough to have finished by the current time. 
5. Model Derivation 
Each task in the project has a normal duration, the amount of time required to 
complete without any special expediting effort.  Completing a task requires the expendi-
ture of some fixed amount of one or more non-renewable resources (raw materials, 
energy, labor, machinery, etc.).  A fixed amount of each resource is allocated to the entire 
project.  The duration of a task can be shortened down to some non-negative minimum 
level by applying additional resources to “crash” the task.  The proliferator may expend 
his resources at any time and any rate he chooses, but the cumulative usage of each re-
source may never exceed the total quantity available.  If the project is interdicted and a 
task is delayed, a fixed amount of time is added to the duration of that task.  The relation-











task duration Task finish
Figure 1. Task duration with expediting effort, both without and including inter-
diction delay. 
The duration of an uninterdicted task (left) may be expedited from its longest 
duration to its shortest.  Interdicting the task adds a fixed length of time to its 
duration (right) while still allowing expediting effort to reduce its overall du-
ration. 
Early analytical project management work [e.g., Malcolm, et al, 1959] assumed 
that if a task depended on another in any way, the later task could not begin until imme-
diately after all of its prerequisites had been completed.  This was later generalized in a 
model called precedence diagramming by J. David Craig [International Business Ma-
chines, 1968].  Precedence diagramming permits every combination of pairwise partial 
orders between predecessor and successor task start and finish.  Given this generality, it is 
easy to accommodate a lag- or lead-time between pairs of tasks.  These relationships are 
shown in Figure 2. 
S F2S F1  
S F1 S F2  
(a) (b) 
S F1 S F2  
S F1 S F2  
(c) (d) 
Figure 2. Partial orders between predecessor and successor tasks. 
Possible combinations are finish-to-start (a), start-to-start (b), finish-to-finish 
(c) and start-to-finish (d).  All lags are shown as positive values (Task 2 “lags” 
Task 1), although zero and negative lags (“leads”) are also allowed. 
Crowston and Thompson [1967] introduce decision CPM that allows alternate 
courses of action to achieve milestones.  Their formulation divides the project tasks into 
sets based on where the decision points are in the project network.  Each set of tasks is 
assigned a binary variable that indicates whether that set of tasks is actually completed in 
the project.  For our purposes, it is more practical to assign each task in the project its 


















Figure 3. A decision critical path method project network depicting one decision. 
Similar to the notation introduced by Crowston and Thompson [1967], deci-
sion nodes are indicated by triangle.  The nodes with the heavy border must be 
completed in order to finish the project.  If Task 7 is chosen (left), all tasks are 
completed while if Task 8 is chosen (right), Task 7 is never completed.  Dot-
ted lines indicate discretionary precedence constraints that are relaxed. 
relationships between them.  The effect of a decision on the completion of a project is 
shown in Figure 3. 
C. DELAYING A PROJECT WITH A FIXED DECISION PLAN 
The interdictor chooses a set of project tasks to delay in order to maximize the 
length of the critical path.  This model assumes that the proliferator is unaware of the in-
terdiction effort and does nothing to compensate even after the interdictor inflicts a delay.  
This requires as input the result of expediting the project with no interdiction. Slack is 
calculated for each task from an earliest start time and a latest start time as in conven-
tional CPM.  Expediting the project provides the earliest start times directly and latest 
start times are easily calculated using the length of each expedited task.  Tasks on the 
critical path have zero slack while a positive slack implies the task is not on the critical 
path. 
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1.  Data [units] 
dCosti cost to delay task i ∈ AN −σ − τ  [$] 
dBudget delaying cost budget [$] 
maxInt maximum number of interdictions allowed [count] 
slacki  the difference between the latest start time and earliest start time for task 
i ∈ N  [days]. 
ˆ d i  the fixed decision plan;  if task iˆ d i =1 ∈ N  is actually completed, 0 oth-
erwise [binary] 
2. Variables [units] 
Xi  the delay plan; Xi =1 if task i ∈ AN −σ − τ  is interdicted, 0 otherwise 
[binary] 
3. Delaying a Project 
max
X
   (b0) delayi − slacki( Xi




∑ ≤ maxInt   (b1) 
 dCostiXi
i∈AN−σ −τ
∑ ≤ dBudget   (b2) 
  Xi ∈ 0,1{ } ∀i ∈ AN −σ − τ  (b3) 
The objective function (b0) greedily favors delay plans that lie on the critical path 
( d  and ).  The delay added to the project is either the total delay from that 
task if it is on the expedited critical path or an amount reduced by the slack at that task.  
Constraint (b1) limits the maximum number of interdictions allowed and (b2) enforces 
the delaying budget.  Constraints (b3) require the interdiction decisions to be binary. 
ˆ 
i =1 slacki = 0
Even though the interdictor may achieve complete surprise with his delaying ef-
fort, as Israel did with its attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor facility, the proliferator will 
almost certainly become aware of the interdiction after the fact.  We assume an intelligent 
adversary will reevaluate his options at this point and take immediate action to mitigate 
the effects of the interdiction. 
D. A TWO-SIDED MODEL:  DELAYING A PROJECT WHEN THE 
PROLIFERATOR AND THE INTERDICTOR CAN SEE EACH OTHER’S 
ACTIONS 
1. Finding the Best Delay Plan 
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We now assume complete transparency between proliferator and interdictor—
each side is fully aware of the other’s capabilities, limitations and intentions.  We seek a 
delay plan that maximizes the length of the project even if the proliferator anticipates our 
1) Start with proliferator’s optimal plan without interdiction 
2) Find a unique interdiction plan 
3) Determine the proliferator’s response to this plan 
4) Repeat steps 2) through 4) as long as desired or until all possible delay 
plans have been evaluated 
5) Report best solution discovered 
Figure 4. Enumeration procedure. 
actions and responds optimally.  We implement decomposition methods to accomplish 
this—we enumerate delay plans and then expedite the interdicted project.  We refer to the 
enumeration of delay plans as the master problem and to expediting an interdicted project 
as the subproblem. 
Figure 4 outlines our enumeration procedure.  We start by determining the opti-
mal starting times for each task in the project when there is no interdiction effort 
whatsoever.  The alternatives chosen, task start times, total slack for each task, resource 
usage levels, the crashing plan employed and the length of the project are recorded, estab-
lishing an incumbent baseline to use later.  Information about the task slack identifies the 
critical path and enables the master problem to quickly find candidate delay plans that 
will have a large impact on the project length.  Infeasibility in the subproblem at this 
stage indicates a problem with the data—insufficient budget or resources, conflict be-
tween the elapsed time and progress of certain tasks, or et cetera.  If the subproblem is 
feasible, we proceed by initializing a counter that tracks the number of times we solve the 
master problem. 
Our master problem finds a delay plan with the maximum effect on the project 
length that is different in at least one detail from all the delay plans that have already 
been considered.  For a task that is on the critical path, delaying it adds the full interdic-
tion delay to the length of the project.  If a task is not on the critical path, an interdiction 
has to lengthen it enough to overcome its slack duration before adding anything to the 
length of the project.  Both of these statements assume that the proliferator does not then 
choose a different course of action that excludes the task in question.  Infeasibility in the 
master problem indicates that we have enumerated every feasible delay plan. 
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The subproblem evaluates the latest candidate delay plan generated by the master 
problem.  If this delay plan interdicts all of the tasks actually completed in the expedited 
project, or if every interdicted task is on the resulting critical path, then we have found a 
lower bound on the amount of delay that the interdictor can inflict.  We compute the 
bound by recomputing the master problem objective using the new slack values from the 
subproblem.  We require all subsequent candidate delay plans to cause at least this much 
delay to the project.  If the subproblem is infeasible, the current delay plan is ideal—the 
proliferator has exhausted all of his resources and can never finish the project.  We re-
cord the length of the delayed project (infinity if it was infeasible) for this delay plan.  
Expecting that there may be alternate delay plans that lead to an identical or improved 
expedited project length, we continue to solve the master problem to find another candi-
date delay plan. 
Each cycle of solving the master problem followed by the subproblem is termed 
an iteration.  This cycle repeats until all interdiction options have been explored and the 
optimal delay plan can be determined, the master problem objective falls below the iden-
tified lower bound, or the number of iterations reaches some preset limit.  Because we 
save information about the candidate results of each iteration, it is easy to find and report 
the best candidates. 
2. Data [units] 
budgetUsed crashing cost budget consumed prior to time t [$] 
iter current iteration counter [count] 
maxIter maximum number of iterations allowed [count] 
totalDelay total delay to project tasks caused by a delay plan [days]  
lengthk the overall expedited project length in iteration k ∈ 0,…,maxIter{ } [days] 
slackik  the difference between the latest start time and earliest start time for task 
i ∈ N  in iteration k ∈ 0,…,maxIter{ } [days]. 
ˆ ar  amount of resource r ∈ R  consumed prior to time t [resource r-units] 
ˆ d ik  the decision plan for iteration k ∈ 0,…,maxIter{ };  if task iˆ d ik =1 ∈ N  is 
actually completed in iteration k, 0 otherwise [binary] 
ˆ sik  earliest start time of task i ∈ N  in iteration k ∈ 0,…,maxIter{ } [days] 
ˆ ui   if task iˆ ui =1 ∈ N −σ  is a successor of any task in the delay plan being 
evaluated, 0 otherwise [binary] 
ˆ δ ik  the crashing plan for iteration k ∈ 0,…,maxIter{ };  is the amount of 
time saved on task i in iteration k by expediting its completion [days] 
ˆ δ ik
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ˆ xik  the delay plan for iteration k ∈ 0,…,maxIter{ }; ˆ xik =1 if task 
i ∈ AN −σ − τ  is interdicted in iteration k, 0 otherwise [binary] 
3. Variables [units] 
Ui  if task Ui =1 i ∈ N −σ  is in the current delay plan or is a successor of any 
task in the delay plan, 0 otherwise [binary] 
4. Enumerating Delay Plans 
The interdictor chooses a set of project tasks to delay to maximize the length of 
the longest path in the project network.  This model finds a set of tasks to delay. 
max
X
 delayi − slacki,iter−1( )Xi
i| ˆ d i ,iter−1 =1
∑ + delayiXi
i| ˆ d i ,iter−1 = 0
∑  (e0) 
s.t.  1− Xi( )
i| ˆ xik =1
∑ + Xi
i| ˆ xik = 0
∑ ≥1 ∀k ∈ 0,…,iter −1{ } (e1) 
 Xi
i∈AN−σ −τ
∑ ≤ maxInt   (e2) 
 dCostiXi
i∈AN−σ −τ
∑ ≤ dBudget   (e3) 
  Xi ∈ 0,1{ } ∀i ∈ AN −σ − τ  (e4) 
Given the newest expediting plan, the objective function (e0) evaluates candidate 
delay plans.  If a task is completed in the newest expedited plan, then the new delay 
added is either the total delay from that task if it was on the expedited critical path or an 
amount reduced by the slack at that task.  Tasks not included in the newest expediting 
plan are given a maximal delay because, in some situations, a combination of other inter-
dictions could force the proliferator to choose a different decision plan that includes tasks 
that were previously excluded. 
There is a diversity constraint (e1) for each legacy delay plan that requires the 
Hamming distance [Hamming, 1986] between each legacy delay plan and any new delay 
plan to be at least one (i.e., a new delay plan must differ in at least one detail).  Master 
problems with diversity constraints are not new [e.g., see the “covering decomposition” 
of Israeli and Wood, 2002].  Constraints (e2) through (e4) are identical to constraints (b1) 
through (b3). 
Our enumeration algorithm will eventually evaluate every feasible delay plan in 
the search for an optimal solution.  We stop the enumeration if we discover a solution we 
can prove is optimal, or acceptably close to optimal (within some moderating decomposi-
tion tolerance).  However, this algorithm has exponential worst-case runtime.  If we place 
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an a priori limit on the number of enumeration steps, we have a non-cyclic heuristic 
search with domain limited by interdiction resource availability and diversity among all 
candidate delay plans.  Our master problem objective, which essentially guides the 
search, expresses a myopic, greedy goal:  maximally delay the most-recently expedited 
plan.  Other objectives may provide faster termination. 
5. Finding Tasks Affected by a Delay Plan 
Because we assume the interdictor’s actions to delay a task will force the prolif-
erator to restart any tasks affected by the delay plan, we identify those tasks before 
proceeding.  A solution to this model associates a “mark” with each affected task: 
min
U
   (c0) Ui
i
∑
s.t.  Ui =1 ∀i ∈ N | ˆ x i,iter =1 (c1) 
 i U j ≥ U ∀ i, j( )∈ A − CHILD∩ SS( ) (c2) 
  Ui ∈ 0,1{ } ∀i ∈ N −σ  (c3) 
The objective (c0) seeks to minimize the number of tasks marked.  Constraints 
(c1) mark all of the tasks in the current delay plan while each constraint (c2) forces a task 
to be marked if any of its predecessors are.  Constraints (c3) require the marks to be bi-
nary.  A preferable alternative to this overly formal integer linear programming 
formulation is to find the successor tasks using a depth-first search algorithm [e.g., 
Ahuja, et al, 1993, pp. 73-76].  The search algorithm marks an interdicted task and then 
follows the path of its successors until reaching the finish task, marking each unmarked 
task visited along the way and then repeating this process for each interdicted task in the 
incumbent delay plan. 
6. Expediting an Interdicted Project 
Once we have determined the affected tasks, we determine the optimal expediting 
plan using updated task data. 
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min
S,D,δ  Sτ − Sσ   (d0) 
s.t.  S j + m 1− Di( )≥ ∀ i, j( )∈ FS  (d1) 
  Si + 1− pi 1− ˆ u i( )( ) d i −δi( )+ delayi ˆ x iK( )+ lagij  
 S j + 1− p j 1− ˆ u j( )( )d j −δ j( )+ delay j ˆ x jK( + m 1− Di( )≥)  ∀ i, j( )∈ FF  (d2) 
  Si + 1− pi 1− ˆ u i( )( ) d i −δi( )+ delayi ˆ x iK( )+ lagij  
 S j + 1− p j 1− ˆ u j( )( )d j −δ j( )+ delay j ˆ x jK( + m 1− Di( )≥)  ∀ i, j( )∈ SF  (d3) 
  Si + lagij  
  S j + m 1− Di( )≥ Si + lagij ∀ i, j( )∈ SS  (d4) 
 ( )( )( )ˆ1 1 irr i i i ir i
r i N




 − − + ≤ −  ∑ ∑  (d5) 
 1− pi 1− ˆ u i( )( ) rrirDi + rerirδi( )
i∈N−σ −τ
∑ ≤ ar − ˆ a r  ∀r ∈ R  (d6) 
 biDi ≤ Dj
j | i, j( )∈A− CHILD∩FF( )
∑ ≤ b iDi  ∀i ∈ DN  (d7) 
  Dj ≥ Di ∀ i, j( )∈ A − CHILD | i ∈ N − DN( ) (d8) 
  Dj ≥ Di ∀ i, j( )∈ CHILD | (d9) 
   
∃ n,i( )∈ A | n,i( )∉ CHILD & i,n( )∉ CHILD( )( )






   
 0 ≤ δi ≤ d i − di  ∀i ∈ N − DN −σ − τ  (d10) 
  Di ∈ 0,1{ } ∀i ∈ N  (d11) 
 Sσ = 0, Dσ =1   (d12) 
 Si = ˆ si  ∀i ∈ N | ˆ s i < t and ˆ u i = 0( ) (d13) 
 δi = ˆ δ i ∀i ∈ N | ˆ s i < t and ˆ u i = 0( ) (d14) 
 Si ≥ t  ∀i ∈ N − ST | ˆ ui =1 (d15) 
As in the case with no delaying effort, the proliferator seeks to minimize the over-
all length of the project, expressed in (d0).  Constraints (d1) through (d6) are similar to 
constraints (a1) through (a6) from the interdiction-free expediting model, but have been 
modified to account for the effects of a delay plan on the cost and duration of each task.  
The term 1− pi 1− ˆ u i(( )) restores the full cost and duration of any task affected by the de-
lay plan, and accounts for the remaining cost and duration (the total minus any cost 
expended or progress achieved before time t) of any task not affected by the delay plan.  
The budget and resource constraints, (d5) and (d6), deduct the amounts consumed up to 
the current time, computed with the assumption of no interdiction delays, from their re-
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spective budgets.  Constraints (d7) through (d12) are identical to constraints (a7) through 
(a12). 
Constraints (a13) through (a16) have been removed and replaced by (d13) 
through (d15) that force the resulting crashing plan to respect the progress that was made 
before the development project was discovered and the delay plan formed.  Constraints 
(d13) and (d14) fix the start times and crashing effort of all tasks that were in progress or 
complete before the interdiction and are not affected by the delay plan.  Constraints (d15) 
require that all tasks affected by the delay plan start no earlier than the current time.  This 
effectively restarts work on any tasks that were in progress before, but were interrupted 
by the interdiction.  The proliferator is not restricted from choosing a different decision 
plan and abandoning (partially) completed tasks, if required. 
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III. A COVERT PROJECT TO DEVELOP A FISSION BOMB 
A. A CASE STUDY 
A rogue nation is suspected of pursuing the development of a uranium fission 
weapon.  The United States National Command Authority is keenly interested in delaying 
this weapons program for as long as possible.  The range of delaying tactics is consider-
able, from diplomatic pressure, to asking the United Nations to impose sanctions, to 
covert or even overt military strikes. 
The basics of nuclear weapon design are now well known and publicly available:  
many of the details from the early weapons programs in the United States and elsewhere 
have been declassified and published in the open literature.  This reduces the basic phys-
ics research required to develop a bomb, but unless it is possible to buy weapons-grade 
uranium or plutonium on the open market (not very likely given the tight international 
controls in place today), developing an organic capability to produce these materials re-
quires a substantial investment in industrial infrastructure. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
We postulate a medium-sized Southwest Asian country with a primarily agrarian 
economy [Harney, 2003].  The population is generally well educated by several modern, 
well-equipped research universities.  Most of the nation’s industrial capacity is concen-
trated in a half-dozen large cities.  Many industries are underdeveloped by Western 
standards, but are growing steadily in size and capability.  In addition to extensive oil and 
gas production, the chemical industries are modern and well developed.  The country has 
substantial reserves of uranium ore and is a well-established producer of both ore and 
concentrated uranium “yellowcake” for the international market.  The country has ratified 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and all IAEA safeguards are in place. 
Currently, 50% of their electrical power generation is from oil- or gas-fired plants, 
25% from hydroelectric dams and 25% from nuclear power.  Power demands are growing 
steadily due to population and industrial growth.  Because the growth in power demand is 
geographically distant from the oil and gas production centers and hydroelectric produc-
tion is already maximized, the most practical way to satisfy the growing demand for 
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electricity is to expand nuclear generation capacity.  The nation already has three opera-
tional commercial nuclear power plants with two more under construction.  They also 
have one working research reactor affiliated with a university. 
The military is not large, but has sufficient capability to defend against small re-
gional threats.  The army has a number of short- and medium-range conventionally armed 
missiles.  The air force has no heavy bombers, but is equipped with a few dozen fighters 
and medium-range fighter-bombers.  The navy has a number of small coastal defense 
craft.  The nation possesses a modest conventional munitions production capability. 
This country seeks its own nuclear weapon to counter growing threats from its 
neighbors.  At least three other countries in the region are known or suspected to possess 
a nuclear arsenal and one nuclear-armed neighbor is growing more hostile.  There is also 
a strong desire to be able to use the nuclear weapons as a bargaining tool to obtain acqui-
escence and cooperation from several smaller neighbors and to gain credibility on the 
international stage as a key player in the region.  The consensus among military and po-
litical advisors is that a total nuclear stockpile of several dozen weapons will be sufficient 
to achieve these goals. 
Because nuclear power generation is vital to the country’s economy and grows 
more so each year, they have no desire to immediately jeopardize this by openly violating 
the NPT.  Thus, any weapons program must be covert and completely independent of any 
of the existing nuclear facilities that are being monitored by the IAEA.  History shows 
that most nations seeking nuclear weapons have followed this route and established sepa-
rate military programs rather than divert nuclear material from their safeguarded civilian 
facilities [NERAC, 2001]. 
Because uranium mining and yellowcake production are not subject to NPT safe-
guards [U.S. Congress OTA, 1993, p. 137], the safest path to a weapons program is 
through development of a uranium enrichment capability fed by existing yellowcake pro-
duction.  As illustrated in Figure 5, this will provide the raw fissile material required for 
either of two types of uranium fission weapon (gun or implosion) as well as being able to 
produce fuel for the commercial reactors once their NPT violations have been discovered 
and United Nations sanctions are imposed.  Given the proliferator’s goal of completing 
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Figure 5. Developing a nuclear weapon [from Spears, 2001]. 
We study this up through the weapons stockpile. 
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his first weapon as soon as possible, we assume that he will first pursue a gun-type 
weapon, the same design used by the “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, 
ending World War II.  Little Boy was a relatively crude device, and its designers were so 
confident in its construction that Hiroshima was its first full-scale test [Rhodes, 1986 and 
Rhodes, 1995]. 
The new nuclear research and production facilities can realistically be hidden in 
existing industrial parks, where they should escape notice due to the ongoing growth of 
legitimate industry.  Any additional site security required for the nuclear facilities can be 
hidden from outside observers in a number of practical ways. 
C. DATA DEVELOPMENT 
To reduce the chance of detection while still achieving sufficient capacity to meet 
the arsenal goal in a reasonable amount of time, the facilities will be designed to be able 
to produce five weapons a year.  As shown by the calculations in Figures 6 and 7, this 
production level will require an annual input of 250 kilograms of highly enriched ura-
nium (HEU).  Enrichment will thus require an input of about 68 metric tons of 
yellowcake each year.  Because IAEA safeguards for yellowcake cover only imports and 
exports, covert diversion of this relatively small quantity (5.6 metric tons—one truck-
load—a month) from the existing production facilities should be easy. 
Designing a nuclear weapon and constructing the sophisticated support facilities 
required to build five weapons a year is a daunting project.  Necessary achievements in-
clude: 
• Covert diversion of 68 metric tons of yellowcake annually; 
• production of enrichment plant feed material (uranium hexafluoride, UF6) 
from yellowcake; 
• uranium enrichment, including the choice of method to employ; 
• conversion of highly enriched UF6 to uranium metal; and 
• design and construction of the actual weapons. 
Figure 8 displays the tasks included in the case study.  We assess the requirements 
for specialized equipment from the chemical processes shown in Figure 6.  There are a 
total of 194 tasks (nodes) and 583 task partial orders (arcs) in the resulting project net-
work.  The proliferator must manage five non-renewable resources:  energy, materials, 
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Technology Separation Factor 
No. Of Stages 
For 90% HEU KWh/SWU 
KW For 
50,000 SWU/Yr 
Gaseous diffusion 1.004-1.0045 3,500-4,000 2,500 14,270
Gas centrifuge 1.2-1.5 40-90 100-200 571-1,142
Aerodynamic 1.015-1.030 540-1100 3,600-4,000 20,548-22,831
Table 1. Efficiency of uranium enrichment technologies [after U.S. Congress OTA, 
1993, p. 143]. 
Regardless of the technology used, producing HEU from natural uranium re-
quires multiple equipment stages arranged in a progressive enrichment 
cascade.  The separation factor is the ratio of the relative enrichment (U235 to 
U238) of the concentrated product to that of the depleted tails from the output 
of any one stage of the cascade.  The number of stages required to produce 
HEU assumes the final tails contain less than 0.3% U235.  Kilowatt-hours per 
SWU measures the amount of energy required to produce approximately 5 
grams of HEU.  The final column is the average power consumption rate of an 
enrichment cascade producing about 250 kg of HEU a year, enough to con-
struct five fission weapons. 
professional labor (e.g., scientists and engineers), skilled labor (e.g., machinists) and un-
skilled labor.  He must choose one and only one enrichment technology to pursue.  His 
choices are gas centrifuges, gaseous diffusion or aerodynamic enrichment.  Table 1 lists 
information used to determine the required number of enrichment machines and energy 
consumption for each technology.  A separative work unit (SWU) is a measure of the ef-
fort required to separate U235 and U238 isotopes during enrichment.  Production of 1 kg of 
HEU from natural uranium requires approximately 200 SWU [Nonproliferation Policy 
Education Center, 2004]. 
Our case study employs only mild interdictions, the better to provide a nuanced 
solution exercise.  It is not lost on us that a single Tomahawk missile can render an en-
richment centrifuge gallery inoperable, and essentially unoccupiable for millennia. 
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Feed stock preparation (yellowcake to uranium hexafluoride): 
Stainless steel vessel (dissolution of yellowcake in nitric acid): 
U O HNO UO NO H O H3 8 3 2 3 2 2 26 3 2+ → + +b g  
842 + 6 × 63 = 3× 394 + 2 ×18 + 2 
Stainless steel boiler (boil down of nitrate solution): 
UO NO H O UO NO H OBOIL2 3 2 2 2 3 2 26 6b g b g+  → *  
394 + 6 ×18 = 502 
High-temperature stainless steel boiler (thermal decomposition of nitrate): 
UO NO H O UO H O NOC x2 3 2 2
300
3 26 6b g *  → + + 2  
502 = 286 + 6 ×18 +108 
Gas-solid reactor vessel (reduction of uranium trioxide): 
  or  UO H UO H OC3 2
650 800
2 2+  → +− 3 2 3 33 3 650 800 2 2 2UO NH UO N H OC+  → + +−
  or 3286 + 2 = 270 +18 × 286 + 2 ×17 = 3× 270 + 28 + 3×18 
Stainless steel reaction vessel: 
UO HF UF H O2 44 2+  → + 2  
270 + 4 × 20 = 314 + 2 ×18 
Ultrahigh-temperature gas-solid reactor vessel (production of uranium hexafluoride): 
UF F UFC4 2
1700 1800
6+  →−  
314 + 38 = 352 
 
Material conversion (uranium hexafluoride to metal): 
Gas-phase reactor with particulate separation: 
UF H UF s HFC6 2
375
4 2+  → +b g  
352 + 2 = 314 + 2 × 20 
High-temperature metallurgical furnace: 
  or UF  UF s Ca U l CaFheat4 22 2b g b g+  → + s Mg U l MgFheat4 22 2b g b g+  → +
  or 314314 + 2 × 40 = 238 + 2 × 78 + 2 × 24.3 = 238 + 2 × 62.3 
Figure 6. Uranium enrichment chemistry [from Harney, 2003]. 
We study these chemical processes to deduce the facilities and equipment re-
quired to produce enriched uranium metal from yellowcake.  The numbers 
beneath the chemical reaction formulas are molecular weights. 
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 1 kg HEU metal requires 1.302 kg HEUF4 and (0.336 kg Ca or 0.204 kg Mg) 
 
1 kg HEUF4 requires 1.122 kg HEUF6 and 0.0064 kg H2 
1.302 kg HEUF4 requires 1.461 kg HEUF6 and 0.0084 kg H2 
 
1 kg H2 can be produced from 5.667 kg of NH3 
 
1 kg HEUF6 requires 232 kg UF6 
1.461 kg HEUF6 requires 339 kg UF6 
 
1 kg UF6 requires 0.892 kg UF4 and 0.108 kg F2 
339 kg UF6 requires 302 kg UF4 and 36.6 kg F2 
 
1 kg UF4 requires 0.860 kg UO2 and 0.255 kg HF 
302 kg UF4 requires 260 kg UO2 and 77.0 kg HF 
 
1 kg UO2 requires 1.059 kg UO3 and 0.0074 kg H2 
260 kg UO2 requires 275 kg UO3 and 1.924 kg H2 
 
1 kg UO3 requires 1.755 kg of hexahydrate 
275 kg UO3 requires 483 kg of hexahydrate 
 
1 kg of hexahydrate requires 0.559 kg yellowcake and 0.251 kg HNO3 
483 kg of hexahydrate requires 270 kg yellowcake and 121 kg HNO3 
 
Each weapon requires 50 kg 93% HEU metal 
 
5 weapons/yr requires 250 kg HEU metal 
 
250 kg HEU requires: 67,500 kg yellowcake 
 30,250 kg HNO3 
 2.1 kg H2 (or 11.9 kg NH3) 
 19,250 kg HF 
 9,150 kg F2 
 84 kg Ca or 51 kg Mg 
Figure 7. Calculation of annual raw material input requirements [after Harney, 
2003]. 
We assess the quantity of raw materials required to sustain production of five 
weapons per year.  Requirements are computed from the chemical reactions 
and molecular weights shown in Figure 6. 
25
26
• Nuclear Weapon Development • Design basic gas diffusion system 
• Acquire Research Components  Divert Commercial Yellowcake 
o Design yellowcake plant modifications  Diffusion barriers 
o Modify yellowcake plant  Heat exchangers 
o Divert yellowcake  Pumps and piping 
 Produce Enrichment Plant Feed Material • Assemble research devices 
o Design fluoridation plant • Test and evaluation of research de-
vices o Acquire plant site 
o Prepare plant site • Design production gas diffusion 
devices o Acquisition Of Plant Components 
• Design enrichment cascade • Stainless steel mixing vessel 
• Design enrichment plant • Distilled water system 
• Acquire plant site • Nitric acid storage tank 
• Prepare plant site • Stainless steel boiler 
• Acquire Production Components • Thermal decomposition vessel 
 Diffusion barriers • Drying kiln 
 Heat exchangers • Gas-solid high-temperature reac-
tion vessel  Pumps and piping 
• Assemble production devices • Hydrogen gas (or ammonia) stor-
age tank • Integrate enrichment cascade 
o Aerodynamic • Stainless steel reaction vessel 
• Design basic aerodynamic enrich-
ment device 
• Hydrogen fluoride storage tank 
• Gas-solid ultra high-temperature 
reaction vessel • Acquire Research Components 
 Vortex unit • Fluorine storage tank 
 Pumps and piping • Hexafluoride condensing vessel 
• Assemble research devices • Pumps and piping 
o Assembly and integration • Test and evaluation of research de-
vices o Operation 
 Uranium Enrichment • Design production devices 
o Choose enrichment technology • Design enrichment cascade 
o Gas Centrifuge • Design enrichment plant 
• Acquire plant site • Design basic gas centrifuge 
• Acquire Research Components • Prepare plant site 
• Acquire Production Components  Rotor tubes 
 Vortex unit  Air bearing systems 
 Pumps and piping  Motors 
• Assemble production devices  End caps 
• Integrate enrichment cascade  Centrifuge cases 
o Cascade loading  Pumps and piping 
o Produce enriched and depleted material • Assemble research centrifuges 
 Prepare Uranium Metal • Test and evaluation of research 
centrifuges o Design metal plant 
o Acquire plant site • Design production centrifuges 
o Prepare plant site • Design enrichment cascade 
o Acquire Plant Components (Enriched 
Metal) 
• Design enrichment plant 
• Acquire plant site 
• Gas-phase reactor with particulate 
collection 
• Prepare plant site 
• Acquire Production Components 
• Hydrogen storage tank  Rotor tubes 
• Metallurgical furnace  Air bearing systems 
• Hafnia crucibles  Motors 
o Acquire Plant Components (Depleted 
Metal) 
 End caps 
 Centrifuge cases 
• Gas-phase reactor with particulate 
collection 
 Pumps and piping 
• Assemble production centrifuges 
• Hydrogen storage tank • Integrate enrichment cascade 
o Gas Diffusion • Metallurgical furnace 
• Double-base propellant powder • Hafnia crucibles 
o Integrate components • Polonium 
o Produce natural uranium metal • Beryllium powder 
o Produce depleted and enriched uranium 
metal 
• Detonator and explosive train com-
ponents 
o Fabricate Research Device Compo-
nents (Enriched Uranium Prototype) 
 Prepare Nuclear Explosive Devices 
o Design Gun Device Components 
• Gun barrel • Gun 
• Breech mechanism • Propellant 
• Critical Core • Cast enriched uranium components 
• Cast depleted uranium tamper  Fissionable receiver 
• Machine enriched uranium receiver  Fissionable projectile 




• Machine depleted uranium tamper • Safety and arming devices 
• Initiator • Fuse 
o Design weapon assembly plant • Propellant charge 
o Acquire plant site • Detonator and explosive train 
o Assemble research devices (enriched 
uranium prototype) 
o Prepare plant site 
o Acquire Fabrication Devices 
o Test Research Devices (Sub-Critical) • Large-diameter precision lathe 
• Verify critical mass • Inert-gas environment precision 
milling machine • Verify gun velocity 
• Delivery vehicle compatibility 
mock-up 
• Metallurgical furnace 
• Hafnium crucibles 
o Test full-scale device • Inert-gas environment casting sys-
tem o Finalize production weapon design 
o Acquire Weapon Components o Acquire Research Device Compo-
nents (Natural Uranium Prototype) • High-strength steel cylinder 
• Double-base propellant powder • High-strength steel cylinder 
• Polonium • Double-base propellant powder 
• Beryllium powder • Polonium 
• Detonator and explosive train com-
ponents 
• Beryllium powder 
• Detonator and explosive train com-
ponents o Fabricate Weapon Components 
o Fabricate Research Device Compo-
nents (Natural Uranium Prototype) 
• Gun barrel 
• Breech mechanism 
• Cast enriched uranium components • Gun barrel 
• Cast depleted uranium tamper • Breech mechanism 
• Machine enriched uranium receiver • Cast uranium components 
• Machine enriched uranium projec-
tile 
• Cast uranium tamper 
• Machine uranium receiver 
• Machine depleted uranium tamper • Machine uranium projectile 
• Initiator • Machine uranium tamper 
• Propellant charge • Initiator 
• Detonator and explosive train • Propellant charge 
• Fuse • Detonator and explosive train 
o Assemble research devices (natural ura-
nium prototype) 
• Safety and arming device 
• Weapon case and structure 
o Acquire Research Device Compo-
nents (Enriched Uranium Prototype) 
o Assemble weapon components 
o Production weapons deliveries 
• High-strength steel cylinder 
 
Figure 8. Fission weapon development tasks used in our case study [after Harney, 
2003]. 
Summary tasks are indicated in bold and the Choose enrichment technology 




We present our enumeration procedure as a tool that provides a quantitative com-
parison of the myriad options available to an interdictor for senior nonproliferation policy 
makers.  Analysis of an interdictor’s options in our case study can take several directions.  
Ignoring for the moment our two-sided optimization, the most straightforward application 
answers “what-if” questions manipulating just the proliferator’s planning problem.  Pos-
tulate a delay plan based on current or proposed national policy, inflict it on the project 
and immediately visualize and evaluate the proliferator’s optimal expediting plan in re-
sponse to that delay plan.  Planners can vary input parameters such as the expediting 
budget, resource availabilities, et cetera, over ranges of uncertainty to test the sensitivity 
of the expediting plan.  They might also alter the plan to enhance its consistency with 
telltale symptoms of its activities, to better assess the true stage of proliferation.  This is 
useful, but gives no information about whether a better delay plan exists. 
Using our two-sided enumeration to find the best delay plan for a single combina-
tion of input parameters, we can recover the expediting plan resulting from any candidate 
delay plan that is discovered.  This case study reveals many instances of multiple delay 
plans that all produce the same maximum expedited project length.  A set of such delay 
plans can be presented to policy makers for a more subjective evaluation. 
The final mode of study is also the most powerful.  We again employ our enu-
meration procedure to find delay plans, but we now allow input parameters to vary over 
ranges of uncertainty.  The results probe the sensitivity of the choice of delay plan to the 
inputs as well as the proliferator’s response to that delay plan.  The relative frequency 
with which a particular task appears in the optimal delay plans turns out to be a key in-
dicator of vulnerability and robustness.  If one particular task appears in nearly every 
optimal delay plan, regardless what the input, that is a clear signal of vulnerability. 
Our proliferator has an essentially unlimited supply of yellowcake at his disposal; 
therefore, our case study does not include the possibility of interdicting the uranium pro-
duction.  When we allow unlimited quantities of the other resources, our proliferator 
chooses aerodynamic enrichment and completes his project in 260 weeks (five years), 
given that we do nothing to delay him.  If we assume the proliferator has no knowledge 
340 weeks:  Covert interdiction
324 weeks:  Complete transparency




Figure 9. Value of information to the proliferator and the interdictor. 
The proliferator achieves his goal 64 weeks (over a year) sooner by conceal-
ing his project from the interdictor.  The interdictor extends the project 16 
weeks when the interdiction is covert. 
of our intention to interdict his project, to maximize the total delay we choose tasks to 
interdict that are on his critical path.  By choosing the two tasks on the critical path with 
the greatest delay, we can extend the proliferator’s project to 340 weeks ( 6 12 years, a 
31% increase), assuming he does not discover or respond to our interdiction.  To achieve 
this delay, we must interdict cascade loading and acquisition of either the vortex unit or 
pumps and piping for the research enrichment machines. 
With an intelligent adversary, our two-sided shows that even if the proliferator is 
fully aware of our intention to interdict his project and which tasks we will delay, the best 
he can do is complete the project in 324.4 weeks (about 6 14  years).  This is a 25% in-
crease over the length of the project when we do nothing.  Even though the proliferator 
knows the project will be interdicted and has free reign to compensate, he is only able to 
save 15.6 weeks or 4.6% of the project length we achieve by interdicting with complete 
surprise.  The two tasks in the optimal delay plan are cascade loading and acquisition of 
pumps and piping for the production aerodynamic enrichment machinery.  However, be-
cause we interdict equipment required for aerodynamic enrichment, the proliferator 
chooses to save time by using gaseous diffusion instead. 
Figure 9 shows the value of secrecy.  By maintaining a covert project that cannot 
be interdicted because no one knows it exists, the proliferator can complete his first nu-
clear weapon almost 15 months sooner than if he anticipates being interdicted.  The 
interdictor can delay the project 16 weeks longer if he achieves surprise. 
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Cascade loading appears in all of these delay plans.  In every case, with both 
complete surprise and complete transparency, it is the most vulnerable task in this pro-
ject.  This is useful information to a policy maker or military planner contemplating the 
obstruction of the proliferator’s project. 
Figure 10 illustrates the effect on the expedited project length of varying only one 
input parameter.  There is a clear change in the project length when the materials budget 
is somewhere between $34 and $35 million.  Inspection of the resulting expediting plans 
reveals that the reason for the step is a change in the decision plan.  With a small materi-
als budget, the proliferator is forced to choose aerodynamic enrichment, extending the 
length of the project.  Once a sufficient materials budget is provided, he can choose gas-
diffusion in order to finish his first weapon more quickly.  Figure 11 magnifies the transi-
tion in Figure 10.  Inflection points like this are easy to discover by systematically 
searching the domain of resource availability. 
Figure 12 shows the effect of varying both the expediting budget and the delaying 
budget simultaneously.  It is clear that no matter what the interdictor does, increasing the 
expediting budget available to the proliferator reduces the time needed to finish the pro-
ject.  Once the delay budget reaches a certain point, there are no more expensive delaying 
actions available to the interdictor that cause more delay than the inexpensive one identi-
fied with the lower interdiction budget. 
Figure 13 shows the effect of varying the expediting budget and the number of in-
terdictions allowed without considering the interdiction budget.  Logically, allowing 
more interdictions admits more delay to the project. 





















Figure 10. Project length versus materials budget. 
The proliferator is allowed a $100M crashing budget, 400 man-months of pro-
fessional labor and unrestricted amounts of the other resources.  The 
interdictor is allowed two interdictions and $1M delay budget.  The step be-
tween $34 and $35 million reflects a change in the decision plan.  Lower 
materials budgets force the expeditor to use aerodynamic enrichment while 
higher budgets encourage use of gas-diffusion to reduce the overall length of 
the project by 3.4 weeks. 





















Figure 11. Project length versus materials budget, a closer look. 
A closer look at the decision plan transition in Figure 10 shows that the 
change actually occurs when the materials budget is between $34.6 and $34.7 
million. 
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Project Length versus Expediting Budget and Delay Budget
 
Figure 12. Project length versus budget with one interdiction. 
Allowing more expensive interdiction actions does not always cause more de-
lay to the project.  Once the delay budget reaches $500K, no further 
improvement in the project delay is achieved.  No resource is exhausted here. 
 





























Expediting Budget and Number of Interdictions
 
Figure 13. Project length versus expediting budget and number of interdictions. 





We want to show how to solve practical problems, so we have integrated our in-
terdiction procedure with an off-the-shelf project management tool to manage and display 
the data.  The interdiction optimization has been implemented using the General Alge-
braic Modeling System (GAMS) [Brooke, et al, 1998] and XA solver from Sunset 
Software Technology [2003].  The data is stored and manipulated in a Microsoft Project  
(MS Project) [Microsoft Corporation, 2003a] database.  A custom Visual Basic for Ap-
plications (VBA) [Microsoft Corporation, 2003b] user interface hosts the optimization 
model in GAMS.  The VBA code and custom display formatting are saved into an MS 
Project template file. 
By using off-the-shelf software like MS Project, we gain an inexpensive, flexible 
and easy to use database and display tool.  As part of the Microsoft Office [Microsoft 
Corporation, 2003a] suite of business software, it is widely available and already familiar 
to a large user base.  However, MS Project does not have the sophisticated optimization 
capabilities that we need.  Like all Microsoft Office applications, it permits extensive 
customization with user-defined graphical user interface elements and VBA code.  This 
feature allows us to easily hide the powerful optimization tools from the user and instead 
present only a straightforward graphical user interface to control the optimization proce-
dure and display the results. 
This choice of software tools does present some challenges, however.  The most 
significant of these is the way MS Project requires a hierarchical structure for the tasks in 
the project to ease the organization of large projects.  MS Project displays each hierarchi-
cal task in a Gantt chart [Gantt, 1903] in the style shown in Figure 14.  The black bar 
represents the top-level summary task (the parent) and the subordinate tasks are its chil-
dren.  Summary tasks can be given their own precedence relationship(s) with other tasks 
in the project.  Accommodating them requires introducing dummy precedence arcs into 
the network to ensure a summary task starts no later than any of its children and to pre-
clude finishing until all of its children finish.  (In our model, this requires extra 
constraints for the binary decision variables.)  The summary task must be completed if 
any of its children are completed and the children must be completed if the summary task 





Figure 14. Gantt chart representation of a hierarchical summary task. 
The summary task begins as soon as any subordinate task starts and finishes 
when all subordinates are finished. 
Figure 15 illustrates the customized data sheet that is used to enter most of the 
project data within MS Project.  The hierarchical organization of the project tasks is evi-
dent in this project view.  This sheet also displays the task durations and the decision and 
delay plans determined by the interdiction procedure.  MS Project calculates the cost of 
each task based on the task duration and the resource requirements and costs in the pro-
ject database.  The data sheet is adjacent to the Gantt chart (Figure 16), enabling quick 
switching between the tabular data and a graphical representation of the task relationships 
within the project.  Figure 17 shows how tasks in the delay plan are represented on the 
Gantt chart. 
The custom user interface is implemented with VBA code distributed among two 
user forms (custom dialog boxes) and a code module.  The first user form (Figure 18) 
Figure 15. Selected project data from our case study. 
The “Decision” column identifies decision nodes with a checkmark.  The 
“Completed” column indicates the decision plan and the “Interdicted” column 
identifies the delay plan that generated the displayed project schedule. 
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Figure 16. Gantt chart. 
Vertical lines delimit four-week time blocks.  Each bar with the diagonal slash 
pattern indicates when a task would be conducted if there is no delay effort.  
The shaded box above it shows the effect of an interdiction delay elsewhere in 
the project.  The task bars extended with the vertical shading highlight time 
saved by crashing those tasks.  For example, the uranium component casting 
task has been delayed by 58 weeks and extra resources have been committed 
to reduce its duration by four weeks. 
collects parameters such as the number of iterations desired and the budget, creates data 
files to be included in the GAMS program and then calls GAMS.  Each input parameter, 
including the individual resource budgets (Figure 19), may be given as a range of values 
and the GAMS program will automatically solve the problem multiple times and generate 
a comma-separated values (“CSV”) file that can be analyzed using a spreadsheet or 
mathematical charting and analysis software.  The second user form (Figure 20) opens 
automatically when GAMS terminates or the user presses the “Read Results” button in 
the first user form.  It displays a list containing the length of the project computed in each 
iteration for each combination of input parameters.  Using a quick sort subroutine adapted 
from VBA-programmer.com [2004], the user can sort the list by the values in any col-
umn.  Any intermediate result may be selected and read back into the MS Project 
database for display.  The code module provides links to operating system services [Mi-
crosoft Corporation, 2004] that permit the optimization software to be called 
synchronously, allowing the results to be displayed as soon as GAMS terminates. 
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Figure 17. An interdicted task on the Gantt chart. 
The lightly shaded section of the task bar between the dark shading and the 
vertical shading shows the delay imposed on this task by the interdiction ef-
fort.  The cascade loading task has thus been extended by 56 weeks because of 
the interdiction. 
Each instance of this case study requires less than one second to generate, opti-
mize and return to populate results in MS Project.  The subproblem uses 193 binary and 
385 continuous variables and 1,095 constraints.  XA solves this problem to optimality in 
less than 0.25 second on a Pentium 4 based desktop personal computer.  The master prob-
lem uses 163 binary variables and two constraints plus one diversity constraint for each 
prior delay plan.  Optimal solution times are similar to the subproblem. 
 
Figure 18. Control panel used to enter parameter ranges for the optimization. 
Clicking the “Restrict solution…” check box runs the subproblem to evaluate 
a particular delay plan rather than finding an optimal plan.  This dialog box 
saves all user input and automatically populates the input fields when opened. 
 
 
Figure 19. Resource data. 
The “Resource Sheet” view in MS Project is used to enter the ranges for each 
individual resource budget. 
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Figure 20. Dialog box used to load GAMS results into MS Project. 
The top list displays every combination of input parameters evaluated.  The 
bottom list displays results of evaluating every candidate delay plan for the pa-
rameter combination selected in the top list.  This example illustrates that 
many different delay plans may evaluate to the same overall project length.  
The header buttons choose which column to sort and the arrow button changes 
the sort direction. 
This case study, along with the MS Project template file and GAMS source code 
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V. WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED 
Building on decades of project management research, we present a novel and 
flexible model that captures many of the issues involved in expediting a sophisticated re-
search and development project.  Using this tool as a forecast of proliferation plans, we 
next seek an optimal set of tasks in the project to interdict in order to inflict the most de-
lay in its completion. 
Our prototypic decision support system is implemented using off-the-shelf soft-
ware.  All user interaction and data management are done through software already 
familiar to millions.  Computational experience with our case study shows that good solu-
tions can be found quickly (at less than one second per iteration on a desktop personal 
computer).  “What-if” questions regarding particular delay plans can be answered in a 
fraction of a second.  An analyst can take advantage of this speed to explore a wide range 
of assumptions and find the tasks that are most critical to the expeditious completion of 
the proliferator’s project. 
This low-cost tool can be used today.  It provides quantitative information that 
can be used to guide policy makers working to stop the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, or to disrupt more conventional strate-
gic industrial and commercial activities. 
Many research opportunities in project network interdiction remain.  Modifica-
tions to the master problem objective function may yield a faster search for promising 
candidate delay plans.  The design of the enumeration procedure allows a tremendous 
amount of flexibility with the subproblem and the master problem.  We are limited only 
by what we can express as an integer linear program.  Adding additional constraints to 
the master problem to limit the political, environmental or economic impact of candidate 
delay plans [e.g., Reed, 1994] is straightforward, as is allowing more than one type of 
interdiction action for each task.  The subproblem could be modified to permit a single 
interdiction action to delay a group of tasks rather than only one.  Our subproblem as-
sumes a linear cost function for crashing, although it could be modified to support non-
linear cost functions [e.g., Vanhoucke, et al, 2002] as well. 
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There is no requirement that the master problem strictly interdict the proliferation 
subproblem.  We can use any integer linear master problem we please to manipulate the 
proliferation optimization to suit our needs.  For instance, we might state a master prob-
lem that reschedules a proliferation effort to maximize its compliance with telltale 
intelligence about a covert proliferator’s actions—evidence of new construction, equip-
ment requisitions, alliances with other proliferators, radiological emissions, power 
consumption patterns, communications intercepts, et cetera.  By systematically enumerat-
ing alternate proliferation plans, we would hope to identify those that are maximally 
consistent with what we observe.  This immediately yields a tool for evaluating the likely 
state of a covert weapons program given partial information. 
Further refinement of the software developed here could provide valuable func-
tionality.  Automating the creation of visual displays such as Figures 11 and 13 would be 
useful.  A tool to visualize changes in the decision plan in response to changing input pa-
rameters would be helpful as well.  Migrating the optimization model from GAMS to a 
general-purpose programming language with a directly callable solver package such as 
the XA callable subroutine library would significantly speed solution times for larger 
problems, enabling a more thorough exploration of the problem space for the decision 
maker. 
We are suggesting how to organize and manage intelligence data in a cohesive 
fashion that offers visualization, data base functionality and interoperability with Micro-
soft Office.  The optimization is new, but cleanly hidden from view.  An analyst, or even 
a policy maker, can pose questions, get answers and gain deep insights without any 
mathematical background at all. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AON Activity on node 
CPM Critical path method 
GAMS Generalized Algebraic Modeling System 
HEU Highly enriched uranium 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
MS Project Microsoft Project software 
NERAC Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee 
NPT The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
OTA Office of Technology Assessment 
PERT Program evaluation and review technique 
SWU Separative work unit 
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